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How People Judge Institutional Corruption
ELINOR AMIT, EUGY HAN, ANN-CHRISTIN POSTEN
& STEVEN SLOMAN
Institutional corruption refers to actions that are legal yet carry negative
consequences for the greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been
observed among politicians and donors who establish quid-pro-quo relationships
in exchange for money and among doctors who receive gifts from pharmaceutical
companies in return for recommending the companies’ drugs. How does the
general public reconcile the tension between the legal status of an action and its
impact on the greater good and judge the action’s moral acceptability? We
explored this question empirically by comparing the relative weight people give to
the legal status of actions and to the impact of actions when judging moral
acceptability. Results show that people unequivocally rely on legal status and
ignore the impact of the actions. We conclude that people outsource their moral
judgments to the law. The law does not simply reflect people’s sense of corruption
but determines it. Together, our research suggests a surprising and ironic role for
the law: that it diminishes independent, critical thinking.
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How People Judge Institutional Corruption
ELINOR AMIT *, EUGY HAN **, ANN-CHRISTIN POSTEN ***
& STEVEN SLOMAN ****
Former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, Martin Shkreli, gained a high
profile in 2015 when he purchased the rights to a lifesaving HIV drug,
Daraprim, and hiked up its price by more than 5000%.1 While such acts of
price gouging can often be observed in business, Shkreli’s act created
controversy because Daraprim is on the World Health Organization’s List
of Essential Medicines.2 Though Shkreli was heavily criticized, he justified
his actions with the response: “[E]verything we’ve done is legal.”3 Shkreli
was right. His actions, potentially ruining the lives of a large number of
people, were legal. And he was not alone. Legal actions that result in
terrible consequences are, in fact, quite common, from pharmaceutical
companies partnering with doctors to prescribe their more expensive
drugs,4 to politicians who establish quid-pro-quo relationships with donors
who anonymously give them unlimited amounts of money,5 to the
*
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University of Cologne; University of Limerick.
****
Brown University.
1
Robert Mclean, Turing Cuts Hospital Price for Drug It Hiked 5,000%, CNNMONEY (Nov. 25,
2015,
8:17
AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/companies/turing-pharmaceuticalsdaraprim-price-drop/.
2
Id.
3
See ROBERT B. REICH, THE COMMON GOOD 10 (2018) (describing Shkreli’s response to
criticism of the Daraprim price hike); Richard Mark Kirkner, Drug Pricing Regulation Pushed from
Many Sides, MANAGED CARE, Jan. 2016, at 14, 15 (noting criticism of Shkreli and Turing by 2016
presidential candidates and Merck CEO).
4
See Lisa Cosgrove & Robert Whitaker, Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption: Lessons
from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 16–19 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 9,
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261375 (explaining how relationships
between doctors and pharmaceutical companies create conflicts of interest and worsen quality of care);
BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS 316
(2012) (describing how senior doctors were paid by pharmaceutical companies to promote their drugs,
changing the prescribing behavior of other doctors).
5
See Elinor Amit et al., Institutional Corruption Revisited: Exploring Open Questions Within the
Institutional Corruption Literature, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 447, 453 (2017) (explaining how the
current United States campaign finance system results in the “donor class” exerting a disproportionate
political influence); Girish J. Gulati, Super PACs and Financing the 2012 Presidential Election, 49
SOCIETY 409, 409 (2012) (explaining that the relationship between candidates and donors threatens
democratic governance and creates opportunities for corruption); Jonathan Mendilow & Michael
Brogan, Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in Government in the United States, in CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 59, 62 (Jonathan Mendilow
**
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President of the United States who does not shy away from conflicts of
interest by maintaining control over his private business while in office.6
All of these examples have one thing in common: the action is legal yet
carries negative consequences for the greater good.
Tension between the legal status of an action and its impact on the
greater good poses a particular type of challenge when judging its moral
acceptability. In a democratic society, laws are expected to represent the
interests of its people, protect the greater good from individual
misconducts, or at the very least not harm the society. While this is usually
true, lawmakers cannot foresee each and every incident in which the law
will be relevant. As a result, some legal behaviors may end up harming the
greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been observed in
research, design, manufacturing, and marketing processes of new products
and policies released by various institutions.7 For instance, gaming
companies use legal yet socially irresponsible marketing strategies and
tactics to target vulnerable populations and encourage gambling.8
In the farming industry, hog, poultry, and cattle farms often use legal
antibiotics as a feed additive to stimulate artificial growth in their
livestock.9 Through overuse, these antibiotics eventually become
ineffective for bacterial infections, which people often contract through
meat consumption and drinking infected water.10 As more and more
antibiotics are becoming ineffective, new, usually more expensive, drugs
have to be developed, leaving many individuals with no viable methods of
treatment.11 This is one of many deadly but legal12 practices exercised by
the farming industry. Big factory farming industries often lobby for
& Ilan Peleg eds., 2016) (noting that a quid pro quo between donors and politicians is the “most
flagrant form of political corruption”).
6
Steve Reilly et al., Did Trump Keep His 19 Promises to Insulate Himself from His Business?
Only
He
Knows.,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/politics/2019/03/18/president-donald-trumps-promises-didnt-end-businessentanglements/3030377002/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2019, 9:08 PM).
7
See Nikos Passas, Lawful but Awful: ‘Legal corporate crimes’, 34 J. SOCIO-ECON. 771, 777
(2005) (noting that the activities of several industries generate “hidden costs” that are mainly borne by
the least privileged); John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Legalized Gambling: An Economic Approach, in
IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 115, 124
(Nikos Passas & Neva Goodwin eds., 2004) (explaining how the gambling industry targets lower
income individuals and encourages excessive gambling by “consistent gamblers”).
8
June Buchanan et al., The Marketing of Legal but Potentially Harmful Products and Corporate
Social Responsibility: The Gaming Industry View, 4 INT’L J. INTERDISC. SOC. SCI. 81, 84 (2009).
9
Mallory Russo, Food for Thought: Analyzing the Impacts of Livestock Factory Farming in the
United States 40 (May 15, 2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Fordham University) (on file with Fordham
University Libraries); Mark Ritchie, The High Price of Cheap Food, in IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T
RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 178, 180 (Nikos Passas & Neva
Goodwin eds., 2010).
10
Ritchie, supra note 9, at 185.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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government regulations and laws that can profit their operations, allowing
them to sustain inadequate facilities and exploit environmental resources.13
These actions lead to irreversible consequences such as extinction of
species, deadly working conditions for workers (e.g., farm workers are
exposed to harmful chemicals and may die from asphyxiation), land and
soil degradation, water contamination, and exacerbation or climate
change.14 While such practices adhere to legal requirements, they bring
harm of various degrees to society.
How do people resolve this conflict and judge the moral acceptability
of legal yet harmful actions? This question is important, because people’s
moral judgments determine a wide variety of behaviors, from purchasing
products,15 to protesting against companies,16 to voting for or against
politicians in public elections.17
In recent years there has been a growing interest in behaviors which
are legal yet harm the greater good, collectively labeled as “institutional
corruption.”18 According to the classic definition by Lessig (2013):
Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic
and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently
ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by
diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to
achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution
or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.19
A surge of research on institutional corruption in the past decade has
examined its manifestations in various domains, including: the
pharmaceutical industry,20 psychiatry,21 food production and distribution
13

Russo, supra note 9, at 35.
Id. at 16, 43.
15
See Johannes Brinkmann, Looking at Consumer Behavior in a Moral Perspective, 51 J. BUS.
ETHICS 129, 129 (2004) (claiming that “business ethics and consumer behavior could profit from
further development of their overlap”); Oliver M. Freestone & Peter J. McGoldrick, Motivations of the
Ethical Consumer, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 445, 445 (2008) (discussing the rise of consumer action “in the
form of boycott activity, pressure groups and other forms of consumer activism”).
16
Norman E. Bowie & Thomas W. Dunfee, Confronting Morality in Markets, 38 J. BUS. ETHICS
381, 385, 389 (2002).
17
See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 1–2 (2011) (arguing the moral significance and
ethical implications of voting).
18
See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 448 (describing the increased scholarly attention to institutional
corruption). Lessig provides a definition for institutional corruption in Lawrence Lessig, Foreword:
“Institutional Corruption” Defined, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 2, 2 (2013).
19
Lessig, supra note 18, at 553 (emphasis added).
20
See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over
doctors); see also Garry C. Gray, The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Research Funding: A Social
Organization Approach, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 629, 629 (2013) (illustrating the subtle ways
pharmaceutical industry funding influences medical research); Donald W. Light, From Institutional
14
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23

companies, and political campaigns. For example, research on the
pharmaceutical industry has revealed that funding from drug companies
influences medical researchers to produce favorable reviews of the
company’s products, thus enabling a significant number of harmful drugs
to reach the market.24 This undermines pharmaceutical companies’ mission
of improving patient care and public health and promoting drug safety.25
Similarly, in the field of psychiatry, financial conflicts of interest have
compromised biomedical research, teaching, and practice.26 Organizations
such as the American Psychiatric Association (APA) receive substantial
funding from the drug industry, and many of the individuals who serve as
diagnostic panel members have ties with the drug industry.27 “Industry
financial relationships can . . . affect researchers’ and clinicians’ behavior
in subtle ways” potentially influencing “decisions about the criteria for and
measurement of diagnoses.”28
Institutional corruption has also been observed in political
campaigns.29 For instance, the creation of super political action committees
(super PACs) in 2010 sparked significant controversy, as committees were
allowed to receive and spend unlimited sums of money on independent
Corruption to Pharmageddon?, 1 LAB DISPATCHES 69, 69–70 (2013) (reviewing David Healy’s
observation that the FDA and pharmaceutical companies have major influence over the medical
industry); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for
Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012) (“Physician relations with pharmaceutical firms are a
source of conflicts of interest that can bias their prescriptions and advice.”).
21
See ROBERT WHITAKER & LISA COSGROVE, PSYCHIATRY UNDER THE INFLUENCE:
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION, SOCIAL INJURY, AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORM 4 (2015) (examining
the societal impacts of the psychiatry field); Lisa Cosgrove & Emily E. Wheeler, Industry’s
Colonization of Psychiatry: Ethical and Practical Implications of Financial Conflicts of Interest in the
DSM-5, 23 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 93, 93 (2013) (arguing that modern psychiatry has been captured by
the pharmaceutical industry); Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets:
Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571,
574 (2013) (highlighting how new anti-psychotic drugs dominate the market despite being more
expensive and less effective than older drugs).
22
See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 450 (discussing the case of Del Monte Foods); see also Sylvia
Rowe et al., Funding Food Science and Nutrition Research: Financial Conflicts and Scientific
Integrity, 67 NUTRITION REVIEWS 264, 264–65 (2009) (describing issues of conflict and scientific bias
in the food industry); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science:
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. &
MED. 119, 142 (2004) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration’s conflict policy).
23
See sources cited supra note 5; see also Malcolm S. Salter, Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and
the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector 2, 24 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
11-060, 2010) (describing the scope and size of private money influencing Congress).
24
See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over
doctors).
25
See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing institutional corruption).
26
Cosgrove & Wheeler, supra note 21, at 94.
27
Id. at 102.
28
Id. at 97.
29
Gulati, supra note 5, at 409.
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campaigning in support of or in opposition to political candidates.30
Politicians receiving unlimited anonymous donations from super PACs
suggested that there could be a disproportionate influence on policy and
electoral outcomes.31
Despite its importance, determining which behaviors fall under the
category of institutional corruption is challenging. Even amongst experts
there is disagreement over what counts as institutional corruption. In a
survey we conducted, a set of ten scenarios that represent different facets
of institutional corruption was presented to members of the Edmond J.
Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University—all of whom were experts
on the topic of institutional corruption research. These scenarios covered
topics that are relevant for the concept of institutional corruption in various
settings and were selected based on the research of the fellows of the
center. In this survey, the experts were asked to judge whether the
scenarios represent institutional corruption. For half of the scenarios we
presented, 30% of the subjects or more thought that they do not represent
instances of institutional corruption. The results illustrate the challenge in
clearly identifying instances of institutional corruption, even by experts.
The current paper is concerned with how the public morally judge
instances of institutional corruption. We bring evidence that institutional
corruption is perceived as more morally acceptable than criminal behavior,
even when the portrayed action is identical except for its legal status.
Moreover, although people’s moral judgments are sensitive to information
about the legal status of the action—what we henceforth deem the
distinguishing characteristic between institutional corruption and criminal
action—people are not sensitive to information about the magnitude of the
harm caused by the action. Thus, cases of institutional corruption with
horrible consequences are judged as more morally acceptable than criminal
actions with benign consequences. Together, our research suggests a
surprising and ironic role for the law: that it diminishes independent,
critical thinking. While criminal actions that have mildly negative
consequences can be construed as immoral, institutional corruption will be
seen as moral despite having terrible consequences.
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The following experiments were designed to investigate how people
judge institutional corruption versus criminal actions. Moral scenarios
were presented, and people judged the moral acceptability of the action of
a protagonist. We varied whether an action was institutional corruption or
criminal by manipulating the legal status of the action: for the “institutional
30
31

Id. at 410.
Id. at 409.
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corruption” group the action was presented as legal, and for the “criminal
behavior” group the action was presented as illegal. All the presented
actions had a negative impact on the greater good. Additionally, we varied
the severity of the direct consequences of the actions. Research shows that
actions with bad consequences are judged as less morally acceptable than
those with less bad consequences.32 We therefore wanted to rule out the
possibility that people’s judgments are contingent on a particular outcome.
A. Experiment 1A
1. Participants and Design
Participants were 131 MTurkers (75 females; Mage = 34.06, SD =
11.15) who participated in exchange for payment. The participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs.
Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Large) between-subjects design. In this and
all subsequent studies: (A) we set a sample size based on previous research
that had used similar methods and stimuli33; (B) our only a-priori selection
criteria was recruiting subjects residing in the United States; and (C) we
did not exclude any subject from the analysis. Any gap between the
number of subjects recruited and reported in the “Participants” section and
the final analysis are due to incompletion of the questionnaire by subjects
(less than 0.5% of the recruited subjects in each experiment).
2. Procedure
Subjects were asked to read three scenarios that described actions of a
protagonist. Half of the subjects were informed that this action is legal, and
the other half that it is illegal. In each of these groups, half of the subjects
were informed that the action is slightly harmful and the other half that it is
significantly harmful. After reading each scenario, the subjects were asked
whether the actions of the protagonist are morally permissible on a scale
that ranged between 1 (completely impermissible) to 7 (completely
permissible). The subjects were subsequently asked whether the action of
the protagonist is legal on a scale that ranged from 1 (completely legal) to
7 (completely illegal) and how would they rate the impact of the action on
a scale that ranged from 1 (negligible impact) to 7 (strong impact). Finally,
in this and all subsequent experiments, subjects were asked several
demographic questions, including gender, age, whether they live in the
32
See, e.g., Elinor Amit & Joshua D. Greene, You See, the Ends Don’t Justify the Means: Visual
Imagery and Moral Judgment, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 861, 861 (2012) (discussing how a consequentialist
judgment that “favor[s] the greater good” is often deemed to be more morally salient); Jonathan Baron,
Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 3 (1994).
33
Elinor Amit, Jonathan Koralnik & Ann-Christin Posten, Mental Imagery of Institutional
Corruption (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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United States, what is their native language, level of education, income
(range), whether they support federal regulation, how liberal versus
conservative they are with regards to economic and social issues, and who
they voted for in the last election.
The three scenarios are presented below. In the following scenarios,
legal actions appear in the text; illegal in parentheses. Big impact appears
in the text; small impact in parentheses.
i.

Scenario 1 (hospital)

Suppose there is a head of a hospital network who receives money
from a pharmaceutical company to give a talk. The head of the network
then contemplates changing the hospital network’s electronic drug
prescribing system from prescribing generic drugs as the default to
prescribing brand name drugs as the default. Changing the default option
from generic to brand name drugs has been shown to increase the
percentage of brand name drugs prescribed. While the brand name drug is
effectively identical to the generic, the brand name costs patients and
insurance companies more, and earns the drug company more. The hospital
director decides to change the electronic drug prescribing system to make
brand name drugs the default. The increase in the percentage of brand
name drugs prescribed causes patients and insurance companies to pay
significantly (slightly) more for medications. According to the State
Medical Board, it is legal for doctors to accept payments from
pharmaceutical companies of up to $10,000 ($4000). The pharmaceutical
company paid the doctor $7000.
ii.

Scenario 2 (coal)

Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) sets limits on certain pollutants. State governments can choose to
make the state laws stricter than those of the EPA, though no state can
have more lenient laws than those of the EPA. Suppose there is a CEO of a
coal factory who is deciding whether to increase the energy produced by
the plant. In order to produce energy, the factory burns fossil fuels, which
emit air pollution into the surrounding towns. Notably, the percentage of
residents in the closest town that have asthma is significantly (slightly)
greater than the national average. According to the state law, it is legal for
the coal factory to emit up to 40,000 (20,000) tons per year. The CEO
decides to increase the factory’s air pollution emission to approximately
30,000 tons per year to meet his energy goals.
iii.

Scenario 3 (army)

Suppose there is a retired army general who serves as a director at a
defense contractor and also advises the Department of Defense (DoD). As
a director of a defense contractor, his job is to advocate for the weapons his
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company produces. However, as an advisor, his job is to help find and
purchase the most effective weaponry for the United States Army. The
American military relies on the Department of Defense to choose top
quality weapons. The general advises the DoD in favor of choosing his
company’s products and the Department decides to follow his advice.
Notably, some of the weapons sold by his company may not be the most
cost-effective choices. Because of the cost of these weapons, the Army will
have to significantly (slightly) decrease the budgets of other agencies.
According to federal law, it is legal for DoD advisors to withhold
information about conflicts of interest on purchases under $30 ($20)
billion. The general advises the DoD to purchase his weapons from his
defense contractor for $25 billion.
3. Analyses and Results
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with
legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as factors, and moral
judgment, legality judgment and impact judgment as dependent measures.
The results show that the legal status of the action affected moral
judgments such that actions that were legal were judged to be more
morally permissible than actions that are illegal (Ms = 3.5 and 2.08,
respectively); F (1, 127) = 35.38, p < .001, η² = .22. In contrast, the
severity of the consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment
(Ms = 2.8 and 2.8, respectively); F (1, 127) = 0.02, p = .877. There was no
interaction between legality and consequences F (1, 127) = 0.19, p = .663.
Legal actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.2
and 6.02, respectively); F (1, 127) = 87.23, p < .001, η² = .4. Legality also
affected perceived impact: legal actions were perceived to have smaller
impact than illegal actions (Ms = 5.09 and 4.6, respectively); F (1, 127) =
3.94, p < .049, η² = .03.
In order to further explore the results, we investigated whether political
orientation affects the relative weight people give to legality versus
morality. Among our 131 subjects, 48 mentioned that in the 2016
presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 33 for Donald
Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other names). For the ease
of interpretation of the effect of political orientation on moral judgments,
we analyzed only subjects who endorsed Clinton or Trump. The results
show that legal actions were judged as more morally acceptable than
illegal actions (Ms = 3.43 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73) = 22.98, p <
.0001, η² = .23. The rest of the effects were not significant. Thus, political
orientation did not affect moral judgments nor interact with legality or
impact.
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B. Experiment 1B
1. Overview
In Experiment 1B, we replicated the procedure of Experiment 1A
using a different set of scenarios.
2. Participants and Design
Participants were 130 MTurkers (79 females; Mage = 36.98, SD =
11.90) who participated for a payment in the experiment. The participants
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality:
Legal vs. Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design.
3. Procedure
The method of Experiment 1B was identical to that of 1A, with a
different set of scenarios. The scenarios used in this experiment appear
below. In the following scenarios legal actions appear in the text; illegal in
parentheses. Big impact appears in the text; small impact in parentheses.
i.

Scenario 1 (CEO)

Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide
whether to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is
often used in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is
cost-effective; using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The
CEO decides to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA
consumption is significantly (slightly) correlated with an increased health
risk of headaches and nausea. According to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), it is legal to sell foods containing up to 2 mg (1.5
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg
of ABA.
ii.

Scenario 2 (scientist)

Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine.
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also
reveal a significant (slight) correlation between using this drug and
experiencing various side effects, such as increased blood pressure. The
scientist decides to re-run the studies that had the best results. These results
confirm the positive findings from before. The scientist only publishes the
positive results in the medical literature. The FDA approves the drug.
According to the FDA, it is legal for scientists investigating the safety of
prescription drugs to exclude up to 30% (20%) of their results. The
scientist excluded 25% of their results.
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Scenario 3 (prison)

Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison.
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support
system of family and friends leads to a significant (slight) increase in their
rates of recidivism. According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons
to transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to
send some to prisons up to 150 miles away.
4. Analyses and Results
As in Experiment 1A, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as
dependent measures. The results show that the legal status of the action
affected moral judgments such that legal actions were perceived as more
morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.48 and 1.76, respectively);
F (1, 126) = 50.91, p < .001, η² = .29. In contrast, the severity of the
consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment (Ms = 2.53 and
2.71, respectively); F (1, 126) = 0.60, p = .44. There was no interaction
between legality and consequences F (1, 126) = 0.38, p = .54. Legality
affected perceived legality, such that legal actions were perceived as more
legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.19 and 6.22, respectively); F (1, 126) =
93.2, p < .0001, η² = .42. No other effect was significant.
As in Experiment 1A, in order to further explore the results, we
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people
give to legality versus morality. Among our 130 subjects, 58 mentioned
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and
29 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other
names). As in Experiment 1A, we analyzed only subjects who endorsed
Clinton or Trump. The results show that legal actions were judged as more
morally acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 4.02 and 1.79, respectively);
F (1, 79) = 57.14, p < .0001, η² = .42. Subjects who endorsed Clinton
judged the behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed
Trump (Ms = 2.54 and 3.28, respectively); F (1, 79) = 6.36, p < .014, η²
=.075. We also found a significant interaction between voting and
outcomes. For Clinton voters, when the outcome was small, the behavior
was judged as more morally acceptable than when the outcome was large
(Ms = 3.09 and 1.98, respectively, p < .001). For Trump voters, there was
no significant difference between small and large outcomes (Ms = 1.18 and
3.38, respectively, p < .68). The rest of the effects were not significant.
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C. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we used the same basic design of Experiment 1, and
manipulated legality (legal, illegal) and impact (big, small). The main
difference was that in Experiment 2 we described impacts as distinct
outcomes (e.g., diabetes versus skin rash).
1. Participants and Design
Participants were 132 MTurkers (85 females; Mage = 36.75, SD =
12.10) who were paid for participation. The participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs. Illegal) x
2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design.
2. Procedure
The method of Experiment 2 was identical to that of 1B, except that
impact was described as distinct outcomes. In the following scenarios legal
actions appear in the text; illegal actions appear in parentheses. Big impact
appears in the text; small impact appears in parentheses.
i.

Scenario 1 (CEO)

Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide whether
to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is often used
in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is cost-effective;
using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The CEO decides
to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA consumption is
correlated with an increased health risk of diabetes (skin rashes).
According to the FDA, it is legal to sell food containing up to 2 mg (1.5
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg
of ABA.
ii.

Scenario 2 (scientist)

Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine.
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also
reveal a correlation between using this drug and experiencing side effects
such as irregular heart rhythms (headaches). The scientist decides to re-run
the studies that had the best results. These results confirm the positive
findings from before. The scientist only publishes the positive results in the
medical literature. The FDA approves the drug. According to the FDA, it is
legal for scientists investigating the safety of prescription drugs to exclude
up to 30% (20%) of their results. The scientist excluded 25% of their
results.
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Scenario 3 (prison)

Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison.
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support
system of family and friends leads to an increase in the rate of prisoners
returning to committing felonies such as burglaries (misdemeanors such as
shoplifting). According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons to
transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to send
some to prisons up to 150 miles away.
3. Analyses and Results
As in Experiment 1, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as
dependent measures. The results show that subjects used only legality to
determine the moral permissibility of the actions, such that they judged
legal actions to be more morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.1
and 1.69, respectively); F (1, 128) = 44.04, p < .001, η² = .26. There was
no effect of consequences (Ms = 2.39 and 2.48), F (1, 128) = 0.13, p =
.715, and impact did not interact with legality, F (1, 128) = 0.07, p = .932.
Legality affected the perceived legality of the action, such that legal
actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.08 and
6.23, respectively); F (1, 128) = 98.42, p < .001, η² = .43. Finally, when
asked about the severity of consequences, subjects estimated illegal actions
to be more severe than legal actions (Ms = 5.58 and 4.82, respectively); F
(1, 128) = 8.76, p = .004, η² = .06. Unlike the pretest, here, where subjects
were given information about legality, the consequences did not affect the
judged severity of 10 consequences, F (1, 128) = 0.32, p = .58, nor was
there an interaction, F (1, 128) = 0.44, p = .51.
As in Experiment 1, in order to further explore the results, we
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people
give to legality versus morality. Among our 132 subjects, 45 mentioned
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and
36 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other
names). The results show that legal actions were judged as more morally
acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 3.41 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73)
= 26.16, p < .0001, η² = .26. Subjects who endorsed Clinton judged the
behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed Trump (Ms
= 3.01 and 2.29, respectively); F (1, 73) = 5.91, p < .018, η² = .075. The
remaining effects were not significant.
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Figure 1. People rely on legality when judging moral permissibility of
actions. Subjects judged the moral permissibility of actions that are either
legal or illegal. In Experiment 1a (Fig 1A) and 1b (Fig 1B), the impact of
the action was defined as having “slightly” or “significantly” negative
consequences. In Experiment 2 (Fig 1C) the impact was manipulated as
different outcomes that a pretest showed were considered severe or not
(e.g., diabetes vs. skin rashes). In all experiments, subjects judged the legal
actions as more morally permissible than the illegal actions, suggesting
outsourcing of moral judgment to the Community of Knowledge.
II. GENERAL DISCUSSION: THE LAW AS A SHORTCUT FOR MORAL
JUDGMENT
The current research shows that people judge institutional corruption
as more morally acceptable than criminal actions, even when the portrayed
events are identical. Moreover, our data suggest that the severity of
outcomes of the portrayed action does not play a role in people’s
judgments. Thus, institutionally corrupt actions were judged as more
acceptable than criminal actions, regardless of whether the action had
severe or benign consequences. Finally, we observed that political
orientation (operationalized as voting for Trump or Clinton in the 2016
presidential elections) did not affect the relative weight of legality and
outcomes, nor did it diminish any of those effects.
Why is institutional corruption judged as more morally acceptable than
criminal actions? One explanation for our findings is that people use the
law as a shortcut to judge whether an action is morally right or wrong.
Evaluating the morality of actions is not easy. Moral judgments of real-life
events involve numerous considerations, including the intentions and
beliefs of actors, outcomes of actions,34 protected values,35 and one’s
emotional reactions.36
34

Amit & Greene, supra note 32, at 861; see Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton,
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Research from cognitive science and psychology suggest that, when
faced with complex assessment tasks, people use simplifying strategies to
make decisions.37 It is therefore possible that when it comes to moral
judgments, one simplifying strategy that people adopt is to not consider the
moral dilemma at all. Instead, they outsource the question to the law.38
According to this logic, the law does not simply reflect people’s sense of
corruption, but actually determines it. This means that framing actions in
terms of their legality is more than just a signal of the actions’ morality; the
framing shapes their morality.
An appeal to the law is an appeal to the moral reasoning of a
community of thought leaders (such as legislators and policy makers) who
have determined the legality of a class of actions that includes the one
under consideration. Outsourcing cognitive tasks to the community is
necessary when problems are too complex for individual reasoning alone.
The many factors that are taken into account when judging moral
dilemmas, including inferences about intentions, outcomes,39 the need to
Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives, 167 COGNITION 1, 3 (2017)
(discussing the role empathy plays in moral responses to outcomes of actions); Liane Young &
Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding and Integration in Moral Judgment, 40
NEUROIMAGE 1912, 1913 (2008) (discussing how children base their moral judgments primarily on an
action’s consequence).
35
See Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1 (1997) (defining protected values as those that resist trade-offs with other
values, particularly economic values); Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320–21 (2003) (discussing how moral outrage may
be triggered by discovering that community members have compromised sacred values).
36
See Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001) (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional processing
to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect people’s
judgments.”); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (discussing how, under a social intuitionist
model, “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”).
37
See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 81
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (“The substitution of one question for another, the representation of
categories by prototypes, the view of erroneous intuitions are easy to override but almost impossible to
eradicate . . . . We show here that the same ideas apply to a diverse class of difficult judgments . . . .”);
JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (“When faced with more complex
choice problems involving many alternatives, people often adopt simplifying (heuristic) strategies that
are much more selective in the use of information.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability:
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973) (“We
propose that when faced with the difficult task of judging probability or frequency, people employ a
limited number of heuristics which reduce these judgments to simpler ones.”).
38
See MASS. INST. TECH., HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE (Thomas W. Malone &
Michael S. Bernstein eds., 2015).
39
See Cushman et al., supra note 34, at 3 (discussing the ways in which learning the outcomes of
their actions affects children’s future decisions); Young & Saxe, supra note 34, at 1913 (“Even though
they can represent beliefs, these children continue to base their moral judgments primarily on the
action’s consequences. . . .”).
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protect sacred values, and the need to integrate emotional reactions to
events,41 make them complex enough to be strong candidates for
outsourcing. For example, an assessment of big pharma’s culpability for
aggressively selling opioids requires an analysis of the various companies’
prior knowledge and goals when selling opioids, the extent of their
responsibility for the multiple traumatic consequences of the opioid crisis,
as well as the amount of suffering that was reduced by the administration
of opioids, and this must be weighed against each of one’s basic moral
values while controlling one’s sense of outrage.
There are alternative explanations for our results. One is that people
hold the law in such high esteem that breaking the law is itself morally
wrong and hence illegal actions are by definition immoral. To the extent
the law is a set of rules that serves to protect people and their rights, it
should play a substantial role in maintaining an ordered society, and an act
that breaks the law should be viewed as inherently immoral. This may be,
but it does not explain why consequences had no influence on judgment.
Presumably consequences should be an additional contributor to our
assessments of an act’s morality. Another alternative explanation is that
legality is easier to evaluate than consequences42 because it is binary (legal
versus illegal) whereas consequences are complex. This is possible
although the consequences in our scenarios were not really complex and
the differences between the bad and very bad consequences were actually
quite stark. It is also possible that legality is more salient than
consequences. This seems unlikely and does not explain why consequences
had no effect whatsoever. If it is a matter of salience, one would expect a
less salient dimension to have a smaller effect, but not no effect.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Overall, these data show that people judge institutional corruption as
more morally acceptable than criminal actions. Two otherwise identical
actions were given different moral appraisals by virtue of their legal status.
Actions that carry severely negative consequences may pass in the public
40
See Baron & Spranca, supra note 35, at 1 (defining protected values as those that resist
trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values); Tetlock, supra note 35, at 320–21
(discussing how moral outrage may be triggered by discovering that community members have
compromised sacred values).
41
See Greene et al., supra note 36, at 2106 (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional
processing to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect
people’s judgments.”); Haidt, supra note 36, at 814 (discussing how, under a social intuitionist model,
“moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”).
42
See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 249 (1996) (discussing the way in which individuals will choose one
decision-making process over another because it is easier).
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as morally acceptable if they are legal, while criminal actions with
relatively minor consequences may be perceived as morally unacceptable.
Regardless of the explanation for the effect of legality and the neglect
of consequences for judgments of morality, the results suggest that people
rely on the law not only to prescribe and prohibit actions, but to actually
determine their sense of what is moral. In other words, the law not only
shapes how people act, but it also shapes what they believe. These findings
have implications for both legislation and how we assess our society and
institutions.
With regard to legislation, lawmakers can take advantage of our
findings by using them as justification to use the law to nudge people in
socially beneficial ways, such as discouraging people from smoking in
public spaces, protecting endangered species, and pushing people to avoid
sugary drinks. As makers of the law—and consequently, shapers of
morality—lawmakers have the power to redefine the relationship between
institutions and people who are affected both directly and indirectly by
those institutions. Through legislative measures, institutional behavior can
be restructured, both internally (e.g., eliminating conflicts of interest,
restructuring guidelines followed by the institution) and externally (e.g.,
evaluating the impact on the greater good).
But the findings also suggest that we should be aware that our
evaluations of existing institutional actions may be influenced in ways that
we are not entirely aware of. Laws may carry information about whether
actions are morally acceptable or not, but laws may reflect values that are
out-of-date, they may have been inspired by technology or other facts that
are no longer relevant, and they may be influenced by political and
economic interests. In other words, there are a variety of reasons to be
skeptical of the information carried by current law. Thus, it is important to
have an independent means to judge the morality of action, not to rely only
on the law as it is written. The foreseen consequences of an action seem a
worthwhile basis for such judgment. Without considering such
consequences, the legal status quo will sustain itself without adequate
rationale. Pharmaceutical companies will continue to gouge innocent
victims and politicians will continue to bend the law in favor of themselves
and their supporters.
Our findings thus provide additional reason to critically evaluate both
the law and the morality of our institutions. We need to evaluate the
consequences of the products we purchase and the policies and politicians
we support. Society cannot rely only on existing law to make moral
assessments; it needs to constantly refresh its justifications for the actions
it considers right and wrong.

